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ESSAY




On March 23, President Trump signed the CLOUD Act, 1 thereby mooting
one of the most closely watched Supreme Court cases this term: the Microsoft
Ireland case. 2 This essay examines these extraordinary and fast-moving
developments, explaining how the Act resolves the Supreme Court case and
addresses the complicated questions of jurisdiction over data in the cloud. The
developments represent a classic case of international lawmaking via domestic
regulation, as mediated by major multinational corporations that manage so
much of the world's data.
I. The Microsoft Ireland Case
Argued in February 2018, the Microsoft Ireland case presented the Court
with a novel question resulting from changing technology and the rise of the
cloud. Does a U.S. warrant, issued pursuant to the 1986 Stored
Communications Act (SCA), 3 reach emails and other communications content
that are accessed and controlled by a U.S.-based company, but stored on a data
server located outside the United States? The issue was one of statutory
interpretation-requiring courts to divine the intent of an act written well
before there was a globally interconnected internet. Several district courts
concluded that the data, even if located extraterritorially, was within a U.S.-
based provider's custody and control, and thus subject to the government's
Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.
1. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. div. V
(2018) (enacted) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Ireland), No. 17-2, slip op. at 3 (Apr. 17, 2018)
(per curiam) (vacating and remanding judgment).
3. See Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12).
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warrant authority. 4 But the Second Circuit disagreed, and the government
appealed to the Supreme Court.
5
From the government's perspective, the Second Circuit's ruling was a
significant security blow: It meant that any time sought-after data happened to
be held outside of the United States, it had to request access via a foreign
government-even if law enforcement were seeking data of a U.S. citizen
regarding a U.S.-based crime, the data was controlled and accessible by a U.S.-
based company, and the only foreign connection was that the data happened to
be stored outside the United States' territorial boundaries. 6 In some cases, law
enforcement didn't know where the data was located and thus where to direct
the request; in other cases, the data might be held in a country that was
unwilling to cooperate with the United States. Law enforcement also worried
that nefarious actors would simply request data to be held extraterritorially to
evade access.
Microsoft, by contrast, warned of a situation in which every country in the
world would demand access to data of interest, simply because it had
jurisdiction over the provider-or subsidiary thereof-that could access the
data, irrespective of its location. This would, according to Microsoft, yield a
free-for-all, international discord, and reduction in privacy rights for all.7 And
while Microsoft acknowledged that the underlying statute needed updating, it
argued that warrants have territorial limitations, that its read of the statute was
therefore the correct one, and that it was up to Congress, not the courts, to
rewrite the law. 8
At oral argument, several Justices seemed to agree that the issue belonged
in the halls of Congress, not the Court. In the words of Justice Sotomayor,
"[w]hy shouldn't we leave the status quo as it is and let Congress pass a bill in
4. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1279-80 (N.D.
Ala. 2017); In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, 275 F. Supp. 3d 605, 619 (E.D.
Pa. 2017), affg 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 725 (E.D. Pa.); In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y.
2014), revd, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (mem.) (granting government's
petition for certiorari).
6. See Brief for the United States at 41-45, Microsoft Ireland, No. 17-2, 2017 WL 6205806.
Companies like Google-which network in a very different way than does Microsoft-pose
a particular challenge for law enforcement. Google's data constantly moves across data
centers distributed across the world, making it difficult if not impossible to employ the
mutual legal assistance process as a means of accessing sought-after data. The result is that
sought-after data may be beyond both U.S. and foreign law enforcement. See id. at 43-45; see
also Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 8-13), https://perma.cc/Q4MT-KQQD (highlighting the legal
implications of different network architectures).
7. Brief for Respondent at 30-32, 38-44, 58, Microsoft Ireland, No. 17-2, 2018 WL 447349.
8. Id. at 51-54.
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this new age."9 This position, however, first required a determination of what
the status quo was-which is exactly what Microsoft and the U.S. government
were fighting about.
The CLOUD Act allowed the court to avoid having to decide the issue-
providing exactly the deus ex machina that the Court was hoping for.
Specifically, the Act amends the SCA to address two distinct issues: the reach of
U.S. warrant authority (the topic of the Microsoft Ireland case) and the converse
problem faced by foreign governments seeking access to U.S.-held
communications content. The following discussion addresses each.
II. The CLOUD Act and the Microsoft Ireland Fix
The CLOUD Act clarifies that service providers are required to disclose all
data in their possession, custody, or control, pursuant to lawful process,
regardless of the location of the data. 10 This requirement is consistent with the
government's position in the Microsoft Ireland case. But the Act includes a
critical addition-the enactment of a new statutory basis to quash based on
comity grounds, "1 albeit in those situations in which the United States seeks
the data of a foreigner located outside the United States, and the request
generates a conflict with "qualifying" foreign governments. In such
circumstances, courts are required to weigh a number of different factors-
including the location and nationality of the person whose communications are
being sought, the importance of the information to the United States'
investigation, and the likelihood of timely and effective access to the evidence
via alternative means. 12 Qualifying foreign governments are limited to those
governments with which the United States has a data sharing agreement, as
discussed below. 13 This is currently a null set, but one that is likely to grow.
The law also explicitly preserves, via a rule of construction, the availability
of common law comity claims in those situations that do not involve a
qualifying foreign government. 14 Such claims can be brought if and when the
demand for data yields a conflict of laws; in response, a court will weigh the
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Microsoft Ireland, No. 17-2. Justice Ginsburg expressed
a similar sentiment. See id. at 6 ("So wouldn't it be wiser just to say let's leave things as they
are; if-if Congress wants to regulate in this brave new world, it should do it?").
10. H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. div. V, § 103(a) (2018) (enacted) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2713).
11. Such claims have a common law origin and are triggered by a conflict of laws, leading the
court to take into account the respective interests of the United States and the foreign
government in deciding whether to demand provider compliance. See Soci&6 Nationale
Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe threshold question
in a comity analysis is whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign
law.").
12. CLOUD Act § 103(b) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)).
13. Id.
14. See id. § 103(c).
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competing U.S. and foreign government interests in deciding whether to force
compliance with the warrant. 15 Notably, no comity claim has ever been
invoked in connection with an SCA warrant-in part because no provider has
ever alleged that compliance with such a warrant would generate a conflict of
laws. In fact, even in the Microsoft Ireland case, there was never any claim of
legal conflict.
The European Union's (EU's) General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), 16 which is set to go into effect in May 2018, may change this, yielding
new claims of conflict. The GDPR sets a number of limitations on when EU-
held data may be transferred out of the EU, including in response to court
orders issued by non-EU countries. Article 48 of the GDPR specifies that such
orders may only be recognized if based on an international agreement, such as
a mutual legal assistance treaty, but "without prejudice to other grounds for
transfer." 17 Given that there is no such international agreement that would
authorize a provider to transfer EU-held data in response to a U.S.-issued
warrant, an alternative basis is needed for transfer to be permitted under EU
law.
There are two likely possibilities, both laid out in Article 49 of the
Directive. First, transfers are permissible if "necessary for important reasons of
public interest" 18-a standard that would seem to encompass, at least in certain
circumstances, the public interest in investigating and prosecuting serious
crime. Second, transfers are permissible if necessary for "compelling legitimate
interests" of the controller not overridden by the interests of the data subject,
not repetitive, and concerning only a limited number of data subjects1g-a
provision that could justify transfers if providers would otherwise be subject to
a U.S.-issued contempt order or other legal sanction.
That said, whether and to what extent these exceptions would apply is open
to ongoing discussion, debate, and speculation. Even those European officials
who agree that Article 49 would allow for transfers in certain circumstances
warn that the grounds for transfer "are to be interpreted strictly"20 -thus
suggesting a case-by-case exploration of whether the transfer is permitted. And
absent an applicable exception, a company that transfers data in response to an
SCA warrant will be violating EU law.
15. See Brief for Amici Curiae E-Discovery Institute et al., in Support of Neither Party at 7-16,
Microsoft Ireland, No. 17-2 (Apr. 17, 2018) (per curiam), 2017 WL 6492198 [hereinafter E-
Discovery Brief].
16. Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPRI.
17. Id. art. 48 (discussing transfers not authorized by EU law).
18. Id. art. 49, § 1(d).
19. Id. art. 49, § 1; see also Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12-16, Microsoft Ireland, No. 17-2, 2017 WL
6383224 [hereinafter EC Brief].
20. EC Brief, supra note 19, at 16.
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Ideally, emerging conflicts will push the EU and United States to negotiate
new international agreements to explicitly permit transfers in legitimate cases
and to detail the procedural and substantive standards that apply. In the interim,
both the substantive issues (do warrants for EU-held data conflict with EU
law?) and more basic questions (can a provider bring such a challenge in
response to the issuance of the warrant or is there a requirement to wait until
contempt proceedings have been initiated?) are likely to be the source of future
litigation. 21
III. Foreign Government Access to U.S.-Held Content
The second part of the CLOUD Act addresses the converse problem of
foreign governments seeking access to communications content that is U.S.
held. This issue arises because the SCA prohibits U.S.-based providers from
disclosing communications content to foreign governments, even if they are
investigating their own citizens in connection with a local crime. These
blocking provisions have been an increasing source of frustration for foreign
governments, as more and more of the evidence sought in foreign criminal
investigations is located in the hands of U.S.-based providers. In order to access
such U.S.-held communications content, foreign governments must make a
diplomatic request for the data, employing the mutual legal assistance treaty
(MLAT) system. This is a cumbersome and often time-consuming process;
according to the 2013 Report and Recommendations of the President's Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, delays have averaged
almost a year for such requests. 22
The CLOUD Act seeks to address this problem. It provides a mechanism
for select foreign governments to bypass the MLAT system in their
investigation of serious crime and directly request sought-after
communications from U.S.-based providers, pursuant to an executive
agreement entered into between the foreign government and the United States,
and pursuant to a long list of baseline substantive and procedural requirements.
Foreign governments are only eligible to enter into these agreements if the
Attorney General, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, certifies in
writing, and with an accompanying explanation, that the foreign government
"affords robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and civil
21. See CLOUD Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. div. V, § 103(b) (2018) (enacted) (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)); see also E-Discovery Brief, supra note 15, at 17-21 (warning that the
courts too often treat comity "as a formality" and do not adequately take into account the
interests of foreign governments).
22. See RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 227 (2013) (noting that it takes an average of about ten
months to process MLAT requests).
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liberties" with respect to relevant data collection activities. 23 The foreign
government must agree to reciprocal rights of access by the United States to
foreign government-held data; must adopt appropriate minimization
procedures with respect to the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of U.S.
person data; and is prohibited from using the agreement to require that
providers be capable of decrypting otherwise encrypted data.24 Agreements
cannot go into effect until Congress has six months to review them; the
legislation specifies expedited procedures for Congress to enter into a joint
resolution of disapproval.
25
Each individual request issued by a foreign government also must meet
specified baseline standards and requirements. Among other requirements, the
requests need to be particularized-targeting a specific person, account, address,
personal device, or other identifier; be based on "articulable and credible facts";
be subject to "review or oversight by a court, judge, magistrate, or other
independent authority"; and not be used to infringe speech. 26 Live intercept
orders must be for a "fixed, limited duration," "not last longer than is reasonably
necessary to accomplish the approved purposes," and "be issued only if the same
information could not reasonably be obtained by another less intrusive
method."27A particularly novel development requires the foreign government
to agree to "periodic review of compliance.., to be conducted by the United
States Government."28
Importantly, the agreements only authorize the foreign government to
access data of foreigners located outside the United States. To access the data of
U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, and others located within the United
States, the foreign government must continue to employ the MLAT process.
This difference respects the commonsense notion, grounded in principles of
democratic accountability, that governments have an interest in setting
standards and rules regarding access to their own citizens' and residents' data;
they don't have an equivalent interest in setting the rules with respect to foreign
governments accessing foreigners' data.
The United Kingdom has reportedly been in discussion with the United
States about a possible agreement for years and is therefore likely to be the first
government to enter into such an agreement, although the text of any such
agreement has not yet been finalized or released to the public. 29 The question
23. CLOUD Act § 105(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)).
24. Id.
25. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)).
26. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of Paddy McGuiness,
Deputy National Security Adviser, United Kingdom).
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of who comes next looms large. Here, too, there are a range of interesting and
novel issues to work out, including the possibility of regional agreements,
perhaps with a mechanism by which all requests are managed by a centralized
authority that can ensure compliance with the statutory requirements.30 Each
individual country would still need to meet the requisite, overarching human
rights standards, but the use of a centralized requesting body like this could
facilitate accountability and review.
31
IV. New Form of International Lawmaking
These provisions regarding foreign government access to U.S.-held data
represent a new form of international lawmaking via domestic regulation,
mediated by the major multinational companies that manage so much of the
world's data. If successful, the substantive and procedural privacy standards that
are preconditions for entering into bilateral agreements will be adopted by a
growing list of foreign governments, thereby raising the privacy standards that
apply. In fact, it appears that this increase has already started. The U.K.
government supported a new judicial review provision with respect to
compelled disclosure orders for data in part because it anticipated that provision
being a precondition to be eligible for such an agreement with the United
States. Other countries will ideally be motivated to raise privacy protections as
well.32 Provisions requiring auditing and compliance reviews provide an
additional mechanism for the United States to insist on application of its
domestic-imposed rules.
The CLOUD Act thus represents an effort by the United States to set
international standards, but via domestic regulation rather than a global
meeting of governments, or even a subset of such governments, working out
new standards and rules.
The GDPR, discussed above, is another such example. The applicable
privacy standards and transfer restrictions of the GDPR apply to any company
directing business at the EU market or otherwise monitoring EU data
subjects. 33 The GDPR thus applies its obligations even to companies that are
not physically located within the EU. Even small companies that don't currently
serve or direct their business to EU customers are being incentivized to do the
kind of data mapping required by the EU; this preserves their potential
marketability to larger companies that do, in fact, serve the EU market.
30. See Jennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, Suggestions for Implementing the CLOUD ACT, LAWFARE
(April 30, 2018, 9 AM), https://perma.cc/UVP8-6M3A.
31. See Peter Swire & Deven Desai, A "Qualified SPOC" Approach for India and Mutual Legal
Assistance, LAWFARE (March 2, 2017 12:14 PM), https://perma.cc/8ZFN-SLQE.
32. SeeJennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, Why the CLOUD Act is Goodfor Privacy and Human Rights,
JUST SECURITY (Mar. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/7564-BEL3.
33. GDPR, supra note 16, art. 3, § 2.
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This kind of international lawmaking via local regulation is not new, of
course. Anu Bradford has aptly coined this the Brussels effect, based largely on
the range of health and safety standards being exported by the EU. 34 But the
rise of major multinational corporations that manage so much of the world's
data-in ways that have profound implications for privacy, security, speech, and
associational rights-takes this kind of international rulemaking into a new
arena. In the best-case scenario, such efforts will lead to norm convergence and
the adoption of standards, as mediated by these large multinational companies,
that protect both privacy and security. In the less ideal scenario, countries may
be increasingly incentivized to pursue data localization and market
segmentation as a means of reasserting control.
35
34. See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 5-10, 19-35 (2012); see also
Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815,
832-56 (2009).
35. For a further, in-depth discussion of these issues of extraterritorial regulation via local
regulation, see Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179, 180-86, 232-39
(2018). See also Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106
GEO. L. J. 115, 165-68 (2017) (highlighting the emergence of new kinds of governmental
networks to address cross-border conflicts over data and the underlying privacy and related
norms that apply).
